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Abstract
We study the evolution of the global arms trade network using a unique dataset on all
international transfers of major conventional weapons over the period 1950-2007. First, we
provide a careful description of the characteristics of global arms trade using tools from
social network analysis. Second, we relate our ￿ndings to political regimes by studying
whether di⁄erences in polity scores a⁄ect the likelihood of arms trade by estimating an
augmented gravity equation. Our ￿ndings from the network analysis are much in line with
common views of the Cold War. We see a clear division between the Warsaw Pact and
NATO, with the Soviet Union being more central to the former than the United States
to the latter. We ￿nd that di⁄erences in polity has a signi￿cant, negative e⁄ect on the
likelihood of arms trade between two countries. The relationship is remarkably robust
throughout the sample period and does not hold for trade in any other good that we
investigate. The result suggests that democracies are indeed more likely to trade arms with
other democracies than with autocracies since the former are not perceived as potential
adversaries. We view this ￿nding as evidence in favour of the Democratic Peace Theory.
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Armed con￿ ict is arguably the single most important source of human su⁄ering governed by
mankind. Due to the high ￿xed costs and the extensive research and development involved
in the production of military equipment, a global network of arms trade is a key catalyst for
such con￿ icts. Given the security issues and moral considerations involved in arms trade, the
lack of empirical evidence on the economics behind it, is striking. Who trades with whom? To
what extent is arms trade strategic? Are governments concerned with the political regime of
potential trading partners?
In this paper we study the evolution of the global arms trade network over the period
1950-2007. The analysis consists of two parts. First, we provide a careful description of the
characteristics of global arms trade using tools from social network analysis. Second, we study
the e⁄ect of di⁄erences in polity between states on the likelihood of arms trade between them,
using methods from economic geography.
While the empirical evidence on arms trade is scarce, the Cold War inspired a theoretical
literature on arms races, i.e. models of how two countries perceiving each other as threats
react to increases in military expenditure or advancements in weapons technology from the
perceived opponent. Contributions include Schelling (1960), Aumann et al (1968), Intriligator
(1975), Brito and Intriligator (1981) Levine and Smith (1995) and, more recently, Baliga and
Sj￿str￿m (2004). Ayanian (1986) provides some empirical tests of theoretical predictions from
the earlier literature. Levin and Smith (1997) provide a thorough discussion of the economic
fundamentals of arms trade in a paper with empirical features. The optimal design of arms
control is modelled in Levin and Smith (1995).
A number of political scientists, and a growing group of economists, subscribe to what is
known as the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), see for instance Maoz and Russett (1993),
Bueno de Mesquita et al (1999), Kadera et al (2003) and Levy and Razin (2004). According to
this hypothesis, two democratic states are extremely unlikely to engage in militarised con￿ ict
with each other. The DPT thus suggests that a democratic state is more apt to sell arms to
another democratic state than to a non-democratic state since the probability of an armed
1con￿ ict is higher with the latter than the former.1
Social network analysis has supplied economists with an increasingly popular toolbox for
analysing complex interaction between a large number of agents, see Jackson (2008) for an
overview. While standard economic models typically consider a small group of agents or
countries in isolation, the strength of network analysis lies in its ability to describe and analyse
the interactions in a large system that would quickly become intractable using standard models.
Recently, network analysis has therefore started to gain recognition among trade economists
and applied macroeconomists, see for instance De Benedictis and Tajoli (2008), who study
the global trade network and Flandreau and Jobst (2005, 2009), who study the existence of
strategic externalities in the international currency system.
We argue that network analysis is particularly suited for the study of arms trade for the
following reasons. First, the fact that arms trade is heavily regulated allows us to think of arms
traders and governments as roughly the same entity. Second, the moral concerns and potential
repercussions involved in arms trade suggest that decisions to trade in arms are strategic. Since
governments are likely to choose its trading partners with great care, the arms trade network
is therefore likely to re￿ ect a network of political ties and alliances. Using network theory,
we are able to identify key players with central positions in the network and study how their
roles have changed over time. Speci￿cally, we are able to identify important di⁄erences and
similarities between the two intergovernmental military alliances dominating the post-war era,
i.e. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.
Following the descriptive network analysis, we turn to factors governing the likelihood of
an arms trade agreement between states. Speci￿cally, we study the impact of di⁄erences in
political regimes on the likelihood of arms trade by adding factors capturing distance in polity
and institutional measures to a gravity equation.2 In order to address the claim that political
1 Mulligan et al (2004) ￿nd that military expenditures are typically higher in autocracies than in democracies,
and suggest that democratic leaders have less reason to worry about foreign military threats than a dictator.
As noted by Cowen (1990), a democratic leader is likely to go to war if he thinks that international victories
will strengthen his probability of reelection and, as pointed out by Mulligan et al (2004), a democratic leader is
more likely to attack a regime that his electorate resents.
2 We are well aware of the fact that, when studying political regimes and arms trade, causality may run
in both directions. In this paper, we therefore intepret our results with some caution but leave the issue of
causality to a follow-up paper.
2incentives are a major determinant of arms trading partners, we also estimate the same gravity
equation for a large variety of non-military goods.
We use a unique dataset from the Swedish Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI), covering
all trade in military equipment over the period 1950-2007. We feel con￿dent that the dataset
is the richest dataset available on arms trade and have been assured of its high quality.3 To
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ￿rst to apply the aforementioned methodology on
any dataset on arms trade and political regimes.
Our main ￿ndings are as follows. In the ￿rst part of the analysis, we ￿nd that while the
global arms trade network possesses some characteristics typically found in empirical studies
of other networks, we are also able to identify some important di⁄erences. Similar to other
networks, we ￿nd that the global arms trade network exhibits a small-world property, negative
correlation between degree and clustering coe¢ cients and can be described by a scale-free
degree distribution. The network is also characterised by negative assortativity, a feature
found in other trade networks (De Benedictis and Tajoli, 2008). Our results suggest that the
most central countries in the network are very in￿ uential. Moreover, there are large changes
in key characteristics over time. The network as a whole becomes denser over time as an
increasing number of countries start trading in arms and, additionally, form more links. In
terms of network characteristics, there are substantial di⁄erences between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. Throughout the Cold War, the NATO network is more decentralised than the
Warsaw Pact and the largest trader within NATO, the US, is less in￿ uential than the largest
trader in the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union. We believe these ￿ndings to be in line with how
most people have come to view the hierarchy within the two organisations during the Cold
War.
In the second part of the analysis, we ￿nd that the largest arms exporters tend to trade
arms with countries with similar political rule. The largest democracies export to democracies
as well as autocracies but, with some exceptions, they tend to favour democracies. The largest
autocracies have an even stronger bias towards other autocracies. To control for factors such
as geographic proximity and colonial ties, we add distance in polity to a gravity-equation with
3 Trade in small arms is excluded from the dataset. Since illegal trade is very di¢ cult for larger types of
military equipment, the exclusion of small arms implies that we face a very small risk of measurement error.
3likelihood of arms trade as the dependent variable. We ￿nd that there is a stable negative
relationship between di⁄erences in polity and the likelihood of arms trade. The relationship
is stable over the entire sample period, i.e. throughout the Cold War but also over the period
following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. We ￿nd no such negative relationship
for aggregate trade or trade in any other good studied. The results thus suggest that it is
the politically charged nature of arms trade, and plausibly the fear of weapons being used
against them, that causes governments to choose their trading partners wisely. The robust
negative relationship between di⁄erences in polity and likelihood of arms trade may therefore
be interpreted as evidence in favour of the Democratic Peace Theory.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a descriptive analysis of the evolution
of the global arms trade network using social network theory. Section 3 addresses the issue
of polity and arms trade by reporting the results from estimating a gravity model. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Global Arms Trade Network
In this section we study the evolution of the global arms trade network over time. We begin
with a thorough discussion of the SIPRI dataset in Section 2.1. We then aggregate arms trade
between countries over ￿ve-year intervals and graph the global arms trade in section 2.2. We
then de￿ne key centrality measures in Section 2.3. The evolution of these measures over time
are reported in Section 2.4.
Throughout the section we study (i) all countries trading arms, (ii) countries trading arms
with at least one full member of NATO (we call this set of countries the NATO Network) and
(iii) countries trading arms with at least one full member of the Warsaw Pact (the Warsaw
Pact Network).4
4 During the decade following World War II, the majority of the industrialised world was roughly divided
into two defense alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on April 4 1949.
The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, commonly referred to as the Warsaw Pact, was
founded on May 17 in 1955 and disestablished on July 1 in 1991. The member countries of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact are listed in Table A1 in the Appendix.
42.1 Data
SIPRI hosts 6 di⁄erent databases related to international relations, military expenditure, pro-
duction and arms trade. The data used in this study is obtained from the SIPRI Arms Trans-
fers Database, holding information on all international transfers of seven categories of Major
Conventional Weapons from 1950 onwards. The concept of Major Conventional Weapons com-
prises aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, sensors, air defence systems, missiles, ships, engines
(for military aircraft, combat ships and most armoured vehicles) and other major conventional
weapons (mainly turrets for armoured vehicles and ships).
Our measure of arms trade is total bilateral exports (imports) of Major Conventional
Weapons over the period 1950-2007. In order to minimise the noise in the data, we have
chosen to eliminate rebel groups from the sample. Discussions with representatives of SIPRI
have ensured us of the high quality of the dataset. We have learned that, since the rules and
surveillance pertaining to arms are so strict and since equipment of this nature and size is
di¢ cult to hide from observation, arms trade not captured by the dataset is negligible.
2.2 Graphs of The Arms Trade Network
In order to be able to graph the evolution of the arms trade network over time, we ￿rst
compute ￿ve-year averages of bilateral arms trade and plot them. Figure 1 displays the arms
trade network over the period 1950-1954 and Figure 2, the network over the period 1955-
1959.5 For ease of exposition, plots of the network over the period 1960-2007 are displayed in
Figures A1-A10 in the Appendix. In these graphs, each node represents a country and each
link indicates that there is trade between the two countries in question. The length of each
link is thus not proportional to the magnitude of the trade, they simply indicate whether trade
has occurred during the period. The arrows run from exporter to importer.
Figure 1, covering the period 1950-1954, shows that during this period, global arms trade is
roughly divided into two networks. The ￿rst network is centered around the US and the other
around the USSR. The same holds for the 1955-1959 network in Figure 2. As can be seen from
5 All network graphs are processed using the Pajek software. We use the Kamada-Kawai method of energising
the data for the layouts as this seems to produce more stable results than for instance the Fruchterman Reingold













































































Figure 1: The global arms trade network, 1950-1954.
Figures A1-A10 in the Appendix, this pattern is preserved throughout the Cold War, but the
divide between the two groups is particularly clear in the 1950s. The plots in the Appendix
suggest that the arms trade network becomes much more dense and complex over time. After
the collapse of the Cold War and the disestablishment of the Warsaw Pact, the divide between
the two groups is much less distinct.
2.3 Network theory: De￿nitions and Key Concepts
We next describe some key statistics for characterising the evolution of the arms trade network
over time. Let N = f1;:::;ng denote the set of nodes in the network. Each node represents a


























































































Figure 2: The global arms trade network, 1955-1959.
j. For our purposes, it is the existence of arms trade rather than the magnitude of the trade
that matters, and we therefore think of each link as having equal strength. In other words, we
think of the network as being unweighted and de￿ne
gij =
￿
1 if i and j are trading arms
0 otherwise
.
The neighbourhood of a node i in the network g is the set of nodes linked to i:
Ni (g) = fj : gij = 1g.
The degree of a node, di(g); is the number of links that involve that node, i.e.
di (g) = #fj : gji = 1g = #Ni(g).
A path between nodes i and j is a sequence of links i1i2;i2i3;:::;iK￿1iK such that ikik+1 2 g
8k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g with i1 = i and iK = j; and such that each node in the sequence i1;:::iK
7is distinct. A path never hits the same node twice. The distance between two nodes is the
number of links in the shortest path (geodesic) between them. For future reference, denote the
distance between i and j by l(i;j).
We next de￿ne key micro statistics pertaining to individual nodes. These concepts are
important in identifying and characterising important players in the network. It is useful to
start with a description of these individual characteristics as some of the de￿nitions are needed
when describing the properties of the network at large.






A country with degree n ￿ 1 would be trading arms with every other country in the network.
By contrast, a country with a low degree would be considered less central. Since the maximum
degree is n ￿ 1, the measure of degree centrality is con￿ned within the unit interval.
The degree centrality-measure has some shortcomings. While it does provide some indica-
tion of connectedness, it says nothing about how close each node is to other nodes or about
the location in the network.
Closeness Centrality Closeness centrality tracks how close a node i is to any other node j
in the network. Recall that l(i;j) denotes the number of links in the shortest path between i







Closeness centrality thus measures the inverse average distance between i and j.
Betweenness Centrality Let Pi(jk) denote the number of shortest paths between nodes
j and k that i lies on and let P(jk) be the total number of shortest paths between j and k.
The ratio Pi(jk)=P(jk) captures the importance of i in connecting j and k. If Pi(jk)=P(jk)
is close to one, country i lies on most of the geodesics between j and k. If the ratio is close to






(n ￿ 1)(n ￿ 2)=2
. (3)
Betweenness centrality is thus a measure of the ratio of Pi(jk)=P(jk); averaged across all
pairwise nodes j and k that meet the above criteria.
We next de￿ne some key statistics that are useful when attempting to characterise the
network as a whole.
Diameter The diameter of the network is the largest distance between any two nodes in the
network. It thus provides an upper-bound measure of the size of the network.






Degree Distribution The degree distribution, P(d), of the network captures the relative
frequencies, i.e. fractions of nodes that have di⁄erent degrees, d. A power distribution (scale-
free distribution) satis￿es:
P(d) = cd￿￿
where c > 0 normalises the support of P to sum to 1: Taking logs we obtain:
log(P(d)) = logc ￿ ￿ logd. (5)
Using actual data on the observed distribution of degrees, ￿ can be estimated from this for-
mulation.
Overall Clustering Clustering coe¢ cients describe how connected nodes in the network
are. Overall clustering of the network is de￿ned as
Cl(g) =
P
i #fjk 2 gjk 6= j;j 2 Ni(g);k 2 Ni(g)g
P







To understand this concept, consider two nodes, ij and ik, sharing the common node i. The
measure of average clustering measures how common it is that also the nodes j and k are
linked to each other.
9Average Clustering In order to compute the average clustering coe¢ cient, we ￿rst need to
de￿ne individual clustering. The individual clustering coe¢ cient is given by:
Cli(g) =
#fjk 2 gjk 6= j;j 2 Ni(g);k 2 Ni(g)g







The individual clustering coe¢ cient of node i therefore considers all pairs of nodes that it is
linked to, and then registers how many of them are linked to each other. The average clustering







Average clustering gives more weight to low-degree nodes than the overall clustering coe¢ cient.
Max Degree The Max Degree of the network, CeD￿
i ; is the degree of the node with the
highest number of links.
Max Closeness The Max Closeness of the network, CeC￿
i , is the value of Closeness Cen-
trality of the node with the highest measure of this statistic.
Max Betweenness The Max Betweenness of the network, CeB￿
i , is the value of Betweenness
Centrality of the node with the highest measure of this statistic.








(n ￿ 2)(n ￿ 1)
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(n ￿ 2)(n ￿ 1)=(2n ￿ 3)
.











10Assortativity Turning to the correlation patterns among high-degree nodes, we turn to
the concept of assortativity. If high-degree nodes tend to be connected to other high-degree




ij2g (di ￿ m)(dj ￿ m)
P
i2N (di ￿ m)
2 .
2.4 Characteristics of the Arms Trade Network
Figure 3 plots the evolution of the statistics de￿ned in Section 2.3 for the network including
all countries. Starting with the aggregate properties of the network, Figure 3 suggests that
the number of countries involved has increased along with the diameter and the density. This
suggests that an increasing number of countries have started to trade in arms. This may be due
to either an increase in the number of exporters (producers of arms) or an overall increase in
import demand for arms. The graphs in Figures 1 and 2, but in particular in Figures A1-A10
in the appendix support the claim that the global arms trade network has become much more
dense and complicated over time.
The number of countries that trade in arms increases rapidly during the sample period.
The diameter increases as well but remains very low throughout the sample, a feature of many
networks often referred to as the small world property, see for instance Goyal et al (2006).
We see that the country with the highest number of links, as measured by max degree, is
increasing in the beginning of the sample but is starting to decrease at the end of the Cold War.
While overall clustering has increased, average clustering has been falling over time. The fall in
average clustering results from the entrance of small, new countries, who only trade with a few
countries who, in turn, do not trade with each other. The fact that overall clustering increases,
however, is the result of the network as a whole growing denser and more connected and in
particular that the countries with the highest number of links have become more clustered,
i.e. that their trading partners have become more likely to trade as well. All three centrality
measures are also decreasing over time, suggesting that the most important countries have
become less in￿ uential over time. However, the centrality measures remain relatively high
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year
Assortativity
Note: All years and all countries in the sample are included.
Figure 3: Network statistics for the global arms trade network.
been able to maintain their central positions in the network throughout the period, they have
become less in￿ uential over time as the network has become increasingly decentralised.
Finally, assortativity is negative throughout the sample but less so in recent years. Nega-
tive assortativity is typical for many other trade and technological networks where countries
(agents) with many connections are prone to trade with countries (agents) with fewer con-
nections. Countries with few connections, on the other hand, are more likely to trade with
countries with many trading partners.6
Figure 4 displays the degree distribution of the global arms trade network in 1950, 1965,
1980 and 2000. The results suggest that a scale-free distribution of the Pareto type, as described
by (5), would indeed characterise the network fairly well. The estimated value of ￿ in (5) is
around 0:9.
Figure 5 plots the degree distribution against average clustering for the years 1950, 1965,
6 This property stands in contrast to many social networks where, for example, friends of individuals with

























Note: Excludes countries with only one degree.
Figure 4: Average clustering and degree distribution, 1950, 1965, 1980 and 2000.
1980 and 2000 and the graph clearly reveals a negative relationship between the two. This
suggests that the majority of the trading partners of the most active arms traders do not trade
with each other, a typical feature of star networks.
We may summarise our ￿ndings for the global arms trade network as follows.
(i) The number of countries in the network rises constantly until 1990;
(ii) The network is fairly centralised with some important central countries and a large
number of peripheral countries (high centrality measures, a negative relation between
average clustering and number of degrees, large di⁄erences between overall and average
clustering and negative assortativity);
(iii) The network becomes increasingly decentralised over time (all centrality measures are
falling over time, overall clustering increases while average clustering decreases and as-

























Figure 5: Degree distribution 1950, 1965, 1980 and 2000.
(iv) The diameter remains remarkably low throughout the sample, peaking at a value of 6,
despite the fact that 150 countries participate in the network.
Figure 6 displays key network statistics for NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We see that the
number of countries and the network diameter are displaying positive trends for both networks.
The fact that the diameter is almost the same for the two networks despite the larger size of
NATO suggests that NATO is better internally connected than the Warsaw Pact. While the
NATO network is becoming more dense over time, the Warsaw Pact density is falling sharply
up to its disestablishment in 1991. We also see that the max degree is much higher in NATO
than in the Warsaw Pact, indicating that the US has more links than the USSR for the duration
of the Cold War. This is hardly surprising given that NATO is larger. Regarding the centrality
measures, they are all relatively stable over time but show that the Warsaw Pact was a much
more centralised network than NATO. This can also be seen in the network graphs Figures 1,
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Figure 6: Network statistics for NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
one central node (the USSR) surrounded by peripheral trading partners who, as a rule, do not
trade with each other. This property is also revealed by the fact that the overall clustering
variable is substantially lower in the Warsaw Pact than in NATO throughout the sample. A
de￿ning property of a star network is precisely that while the central country trades with
many other countries, these are unlikely to trade with each other. The fact that the USSR was
more important for the Warsaw Pact than the United States was for NATO is shown by the
measures of maximum centrality being higher for the Warsaw Pact than for NATO throughout
the period.
The main di⁄erences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact can be summarised as follows.
(i) There is a distinct division between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War,
most clearly in the beginning. Towards the end of the sample, an increasing number of
countries trade with both alliances (see graphs A1-A10 in the Appendix);
15(ii) More countries participate in the NATO network than in the network of the Warsaw
Pact;
(iii) The Warsaw Pact is substantially more centralised than NATO;
(iv) The role of the USSR in the Warsaw Pact is more important than that of the United
States in NATO;
(v) NATO is internally better connected and the United States is much more clustered than
the USSR;
(vi) Density falls sharply for the Warsaw Pact but not for NATO.
The graphic division between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is a naive but compelling indi-
cation that polity matters for arms trade ties. It is well known that throughout the post-war
era, the con￿ ict between the US and the Soviet Union was based on radically di⁄erent ideo-
logical beliefs. While the constitution in the US is based on maximum freedom of individuals,
the Soviet Union has come to represent the other extreme; a regime with limited freedom
of individuals ruled by a highly centralised government. This ideological divide seems to be
mirrored in the arms trade network. The results from the network analysis suggest that the
Warsaw Pact network, centered around the Soviet Union, comprises mainly other autocratic
states. Conversely, the NATO network consists mainly of democratic states and is centered
around the world￿ s oldest and largest democracies; the US, the UK and France. We look for
statistical support for this conjecture in Section 3.2, below.
Clearly, the dichotomous division of the world￿ s states into autocracies and democracies
is a crude approximation of reality. Since democracies as well as autocracies can be either
right-wing or left-wing, it would interesting to study a more detailed classi￿cation of countries.
However, this is beyond the scope of the paper and left for future research.
3 Polity and Arms Trade
Having characterised the global arms trade network and how it evolves over time, we next
turn to the empirical relationship between arms trade and political regimes. We therefore add
16data on political and economic characteristics and estimate a gravity equation where one of
the independent variables is a measure of distance in polity. In order to address the speci￿c
nature of arms trade, i.e. the question of how arms trade di⁄ers from trade in other goods, we
report estimates of the same gravity equation for trade in a wide range of other commodities.
3.1 Data
In order to compare our ￿ndings on arms trade to trade in other goods, we add data on trade
from the United Nations Comtrade database over the period 1962-2000. In addition to study-
ing aggregate trade between the countries in the sample, we study the subgroups textiles, oil,
co⁄ee, chemicals, leather, cars, wheat and rice. Data om GDP per capita is from Maddison
and covers the full sample period 1950-2006. Data on distance between countries, common lan-
guage, common borders and common origin of colonisation is retrieved from Centre D￿ Etudes
Prospectives et D￿ Informations Internationales (CEPII). Data on the degree of democracy is
from the POLITY IV database hosted by the Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason
University. The polity variable, henceforth denoted POLITY, is an index ranging from ￿10 to
+10, where a negative value represents autocracy and a positive value represents democracy.
The higher the value, the stronger the democratic regime in terms of a number of criteria
speci￿ed within POLITY IV.
3.2 Trends in Democratisation
Before proceeding with the regressions, it is useful to take a ￿rst look at the data by studying
trends in the variables and plotting key relationships. Figure 7 depicts the evolution of the
sample size and the average polity over the sample period. The left graph shows that over the
period 1950-2007, sample size displays a positive trend, implying that an increasing number of
countries are trading arms. The trend is particularly strong until the beginning of the 1980s.
During the 1980s, the trend is in fact decreasing but starts to increase again in the middle of
the 1990s. This pattern holds for the NATO network as well as for the overall network. The
trend for the Warsaw Pact is increasing until its disestablishment in 1991.



















1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Average polity
Note: Only countries with non-missing polity data are included.
All countries Nato
Warsaw Pact
Figure 7: Arms trade participation and average polity, 1950-2007.
in the two subgroups. A positive POLITY index indicates that the sample is democratic on
average, while a negative value indicates that the sample is non-democratic according to the
POLITY IV criteria. The results suggest the NATO network was, on average, democratic
in the beginning of the 1950s, but became less democratic in the 1960s and 1970s. In the
early 1980s, democratisation picked up and the average POLITY-score of the NATO network
again displayed a positive trend. The trend for the Warsaw Pact is increasing, but the average
POLITY-score remains negative throughout the existence of this network. These results sug-
gest that a country trading arms with members of the Warsaw Pact, was indeed non-democratic
on average. The trend for the overall sample closely follows that of the NATO network since
NATO comprised more countries.
We next address the question of whether countries are more likely to export arms to coun-
tries with the same polity. Figure 8 displays the POLITY-scores of the export destinations






































































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
China
Note: To make it easier to see the density when plotting discrete variables, the locations of the markers are
slightly perturbed.
Polity of destination Mean polity of all destinations
Figure 8: Polity of export destinations for six key players, 1950-2007.
dot represents the POLITY-score of each export destination in a given year and the black line
indicates the per-year average. The top left graph of the US shows that the world￿ s oldest
democracy has consistently been prone to export arms to other democracies. However, as the
graph shows, the US has also exported arms to autocratic countries throughout the sample
period. There is a positive trend in the plot for the US, indicating that the US has chosen
to export arms to countries that have become increasingly democratic. However, this could
just be symptomatic of the overall tendency to world democratisation rather than of the US
becoming increasingly choosy when deciding which countries to export to. The patterns for the
UK, France and Sweden are more erratic. The UK and France have been prone to export arms
to other democracies except for in the 1970s and, in the case of France up to the mid-1980s.
Sweden has mainly stayed on the democratic-side of the horizontal axis except for in a few
years in the late 1970s when there was a tendency to export arms to non-democracies, albeit
with average POLITY-scores close to zero.
19By contrast, the USSR and China have typically exported arms to other autocratic coun-
tries. The results suggest that they have exported arms to democracies as well, but the average
trading partner has been non-democratic. There is some evidence that China started exporting
more arms to democratic countries in the beginning of the 21th century, but the trend has
been reversed in recent years.
The results also suggest that, compared to NATO members, the USSR and China have
been relatively more prone to export arms to countries with similar POLITY-scores. This
indicates that, in the sample, autocracies have an even stronger bias towards other autocracies
than democracies vis-￿-vis other democracies.
3.3 The Gravity Equation
As reported in the previous section, plotting the data suggests that there is a correlation
between polity divergence and arms trade. In order to test this hypothesis controlling for
several other variables that may in￿ uence export decisions, we specify and estimate a gravity
equation containing these variables. Let Y
ij
t be a dichotomous variable capturing trade between





1 if countries i and j trade in Y at time t
0 otherwise
.
In the same way we de￿ne the variable B
ij
t , assuming the value 1 if i and j share the same
border (contiguity), L
ij
t , assuming the value 1 if i and j share the same o¢ cial language, CR
ij
t ,
assuming the value 1 if i and j were ever in a colonial relationship, CC
45;ij
t , assuming the value
1 if the countries were colonised by the same country post-1945, CR
45;ij
t , assuming the value 1
if the countries were in a colonial relationship post-1945 and ￿nally, SC
ij
t , assuming the value
1 if the countries were the same country historically. Let D
ij
t denote distance between i and
j, let GDPi
t denote GDP of country i; let GDP
C;i
t denote GDP per capita and let RGDP
C;ij
t






t : Finally, let
Poli
t be the POLITY-score of country i at time t. For notational convenience, let X
ij
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where ￿ is a vector of parameters. Letting Y
ij
t denote arms trade, a signi￿cant negative
estimate of ￿ thus suggests that the more di⁄erent i and j are in terms of polity, the less likely
they are to trade in arms.7
As mentioned in the introduction, trade in arms is likely to exhibit some unique properties
that separates it from trade in any other good. First, and perhaps most importantly, the
sale of arms involves a risk of the traded weapons being used against the exporting country.
Second, arms trade production involves long-term investments in research and development
and large ￿xed costs, implying that arms producers may be forced to export their output to
ensure pro￿tability. Third, since arms are traded intergovernmentally, governments are likely
to internalise the fact that the arms will be consumed by the receiving government rather than
private agents in the importing country. Thus, if a government wants to signal its disapproval
of the polity in the importing country, it is more likely to do so by imposing an embargo on
arms trade than on trade in any other commodity. In an attempt to identify the e⁄ects of
these unique features of arms trade, we additionally estimate (9) for a wide range of alternative
commodities with diverse characteristics.
3.4 Results
Columns (1)-(3) in Table 1 display the results from estimating (9) on arms trade using pooled
OLS. For the sake of comparison, columns (4), (5) and (6) report the results from estimating
the same equation using data on aggregate trade, trade in cars and trade in co⁄ee, respectively.
The results in columns (1)-(3) suggest that di⁄erences in polity has a negative e⁄ect on
the likelihood of arms trade. If the di⁄erence in POLITY-scores between countries i and j
7 We do not apply ￿xed e⁄ects to the gravity equation since our outcome variable is binary, i.e. measures
whether trade occurs or not, and therefore does not contain enough variation for country-pair ￿xed e⁄ects to
be applicable. Moreover, the empirical trade literature has recently paid attention to the absence of trade
between many countries, even at the aggregate level. Helpman et al (2008) report that as many as half of all
aggregate bilateral trade ￿ ows assume the value zero (these are often dropped from the sample by researchers
using logarithmic values) and suggest a structural estimation procedure building on ￿rm heterogeneity as in
Melitz (2003). However, we do not believe ￿rm heterogeneity to be the driving force behind arms trade. We
therefore ￿nd a linear probability approach more appropriate.
21Table 1: Results from estimating the gravity equation. Pooled OLS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






2 -1.31e-05** -1.52e-05** -1.27e-05** .000566** 9.06e-05** -3.97e-07
(1.59e-06) (1.58e-06) (1.63e-06) (6.84e-06) (4.15e-06) (3.81e-06)
ln(GDP
i
t) 1.79e-08** 1.23e-08** 1.27e-08** 1.06e-07** 3.63e-08** 5.17e-08**
(2.54e-10) (2.65e-10) (2.69e-10) (1.14e-09) (6.90e-10) (6.32e-10)
ln(GDP
C;i
t ) .000273** .000267** .00275** .00188** .000720**




2 -.000499** .0206** .00734** .00475**
(7.11e-05) (.000300) (.000182) (.000167)
lnD
ij
t -.00899** -.00630** .00623** -.0544** -.0568** .00167*
(.000278) (.000279) (.000279) (.00118) (.000717) (.000656)
B
ij
t .0170** .0189** .0184** -.00138 .0453** .0530**
(.00139) (.00138) (.00139) (.00586) (.00356) (.00326)
L
ij
t -.00492** -.00331** -.00315** .0623** .0119** .0171**
(.000595) (.000592) (.000592) (.00250) (.00152) (.00139)
CR
ij
t .0556** .0470** .0466** .260** .164** .273**
(.00242) (.00240) (.00241) (.0102) (.00617) (.00565)
CC
45:ij
t -.00639** -.00375** -.00388** -.0923** -.0459** .0200**
(.000784) (.000779) (.000779) (.00329) (.00200) (.00183)
CR
45:ij
t -.0123** -.00440 -.00284 -.0248 .255** .00915
(.00323) (.00321) (.00322) (.0136) (.00825) (.00756)
SC
ij
t -.0254** -.0217** -.0220** .0359 .0119* .0158**
(.00199) (.00197) (.00197) (.00834) (.00506) (.00464)
Observations 313925 313925 313925 313925 313925 313925
R
2 .025 .039 .040 .194 .187 .084
is high, they are less likely to engage in arms trade. As shown in columns (4)-(6), this is
not true for trade in other goods. Column (4) indicates that di⁄erences in polity may in fact
increase the probability of trade. This may seem odd at ￿rst, but could simply re￿ ect that
these countries trade for other reasons, such as comparative advantage. Since trade in other
goods is not as constrained by policy as trade in arms, these results could simply capture that
non-democracies may demand goods produced in democracies and that democracies choose to
export these goods as there are no political barriers keeping them from doing so. Exporting
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Note: Estimated coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for each year in the sample.
Figure 9: Polity divergence and arms trade.
country. The results for cars in column (5) are similar: di⁄erences in POLITY-scores indicate
a higher likelihood of trade in cars. In 2007, the ￿ve largest producers of cars were Japan,
China, Germany, the US and South Korea.8 By necessity, a large share of the total number
of cars exported from these countries will end up in countries with di⁄ering political views.
Finally, the results for co⁄ee in column (6) suggests that di⁄erences in polity have no e⁄ect on
the propensity to trade as the estimated ￿ is insigni￿cant.
Figure 9 displays the estimated ￿-coe¢ cient from estimating equation (9) on arms trade,
and the associated 95-percent con￿dence interval in each year. The results suggest that the
estimate is negative and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The estimated parameter is remark-
ably stable throughout the sample period. Again, we compare this result to trade in other
goods. Figure 10 reports the impact of distance in polity on arms trade, total trade and trade
in cars. The plot corroborates the ￿ndings in Table 1 and lends support to the hypothesis that
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Cars
Note: Estimated coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for each year in the sample.
Arms Alternative
Figure 10: Polity divergence, arms trade, aggregate trade and trade in cars.
polity divergence is no barrier to trade in other goods than arms.
However, production and trade in cars and co⁄ee is clearly very di⁄erent from production
and trade in arms. In order to address the unique and politically charged nature of arms
trade, we need to compare arms trade to trade in a good that is as similar to arms as possible.
To this end, we estimate the e⁄ect of distance in polity on the likelihood of trade in aircraft.
In addition to involving high ￿xed costs of production, aircraft are mainly consumed by the
receiving government. It would be ideal to provide an estimate of spacecraft or large aircraft but
unfortunately, the data quality for these categories is so low that we deem them unusable. We
therefore settle for the broader category aircraft, comprising spare parts as well as helicopters
etc. Although the category contains items likely to be consumed also by private agents in
the receiving country, we ￿nd aircraft the best alternative available for a comparison to arms
trade. The estimated coe¢ cients and the associated 95-percent con￿dence intervals are plotted
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Figure 11: Polity divergence, arms trade and trade in aircraft.
trade is negative in the 1960s and in the late 1990s, it is far from the stable, negative relationship
that we see for distance in polity and arms trade. This suggests that political motives and the
possible reciprocity involved in each sale are indeed important factors behind arms trade.
Similar graphs for other groups of goods (co⁄ee, chemicals, leather, rice, textiles and wheat)
are given in Figures A11-A13 in the Appendix.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the evolution of the global arms trade network using a unique dataset
on all international transfers of major conventional weapons over the period 1950-2007. The
analysis consists of two parts. First, we characterise global arms trade over the sample period,
using methods from social network analysis. Second, we address the relationship between
25distance in POLITY-scores and likelihood of arms trade, using a gravity equation augmented
by political and economic controls.
The ￿rst part of the analysis reveals that the arms trade network shares common traits
with other networks, notably a small world property, negative correlation between degree and
clustering coe¢ cients and a scale-free degree distribution. Moreover, the network exhibits
negative assortativity, a property found to characterise other trade networks as well.
The data mirrors common views of the ideological divide of the Cold War. There is a clear
division between NATO and the Warsaw Pact until the disestablishment of the latter in 1991.
Moreover, the Warsaw Pact is more centered around the Soviet Union than NATO around
the US; the Warsaw Pact thus closely resembles a star network with a number of peripheral
traders interacting almost exclusively with the USSR.
The sharp dichotomy between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is an indication that political
rule is a key determinant when choosing arms trading partners. In the second part of the
analysis we seek to quantify this relationship by relating distance in POLITY-scores to the
likelihood of arms trade. Using a gravity equation, we ￿nd evidence that di⁄erences in polity
have a signi￿cant, negative e⁄ect on the likelihood that arms trade occurs. Estimating the
relationship for each year in the sample, reveals that the relationship is remarkably stable
throughout the sample period and even survives the end of the Cold War. We do not ￿nd
such a negative relationship for any other good we study, including commodities highly similar
to arms in terms of market structure and production technology. Our estimation results are
supported by plots of arms exports and polity of destinations. We ￿nd that, on average,
democracies tend to export arms to other democracies. However, the bias is even stronger for
autocracies, who strongly prefer trading with other autocratic states.
Our results suggest that polity matters for arms trade: countries with divergent political
regimes are unlikely to trade in arms. The fact that we ￿nd no such relationship for trade in
other goods indicates that the unique properties of arms trade account for this ￿nding. We
￿nd it plausible that the security issues involved in each trade implies that states are unlikely
to sell arms to governments that they perceive as potential adversaries. The observation that
it is extremely uncommon for two democratic states to engage in armed con￿ ict, as suggested
26by the Democratic Peace Theory, may help explain why democracies prefer trading with other
democracies; they are simply not perceived as threats.
The ￿nding that political regime seems to be such an important determinant of arms trade
suggest that arms trade may be thought of as a proxy for political relationships between states.
In this study, we have assumed that causality runs from polical rule to arms trade but it may
well be that arms trade a⁄ects political regime. First, we may think of arms trade as enabling
coups and civil uprising, leading to political regime shifts. Second, it is not uncommon that
arms trade is conditional on a set of requirements on the receiving government. This suggests
that arms trade between two states is correlated with the political in￿ uence that they may
exert on each other. We conclude that some measure based on arms trade is likely to be a
valid proxy for intergovernmental political ties, but recognise that a number of factors need
to be taken into account when constructing such a variable. We therefore leave the optimal
design of such a proxy to future research.
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30Tables
Table A1: Member Countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
NATO Entry The Warsaw Pact Entry Exit
Belgium 1949 People￿ s Republic of Albania 1955 1961
Denmark 1949 People￿ s Republic of Bulgaria 1955 1991
France 1949 Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1955 1991
Iceland 1949 People￿ s Republic of Hungary 1955 1991
Italy 1949 People￿ s Republic of Poland 1955 1991
Canada 1949 People￿ s Republic of Romania 1955 1991
Luxembourg 1949 The Soviet Union 1955 1991
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Leather
Note: Estimated coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for each year in the sample.
Arms Alternative
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Rice
Note: Estimated coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for each year in the sample.
Arms Alternative
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Textiles
Note: Estimated coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for each year in the sample.
Arms Alternative
Figure A13: Polity divergence and trade in arms, wheat and textiles.
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